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Introduction
The problems of insecurity in the African continent are older than its 
constitution as a “Political Unity”, formed by sovereign states. Since an early 
age, it was faced by several obstacles to its territorial integrity, due to a set of 
factors, many times, external to African interests, such as other peoples and 
great nations conquers and occupations in the 19th century and, in recent 
decades, the greed of various actors of International Politics for African spaces 
(Ginga 2014).
Thus, the increase in the geopolitical importance of African regions, 
namely the Western and Eastern regions, had been gaining greater political 
and economic interest from the main world powers, mainly because of their 
position on the axis of the main routes of world trade and their potential 
in natural resources, which reinforces the continent’s geostrategic value 
(Beny 2007). In fact, although the relevance of the oceans in the context of 
international dynamics is unquestionable, the threats that arise there often 
seem to be less precise, so for several decades, the continental security 
approach had a predominantly territorial focus, since the main objective 
of African States was the assurance of issues considered “priority” (land 
borders), to the detriment of other issues considered “auxiliaries”, such as 
maritime security2. 
As a result, insecurity in these spaces continues to weaken local 
1 Invited Assistant Professor at the Higher Institute of International Relations Venâncio de 
Moura, Angola.
2 Furthermore, and according to Therezinha de Castro (1999, 253), “for centuries, the 
geopolitical destiny of Africa was to live behind the coastal barrier”, so it is inferred that the 
history of the continent, for reasons of cultural identity is characterized by the culture of 
territoriality.
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sovereignty and stability, preventing the harmonious and continuous 
development of nations, in a scenario marked by continuous changes that 
generate uncertainty, which sometimes evolve into multiple crises, associated 
with problems of various kinds3 (Keohane 2002). This context, with 
positive and negative quadrants, has weighed on the political evolution and 
development of African States, in a scenario in which the most frequent and 
main threats to maritime security on the continent, have materialized through 
actions of maritime terrorism; piracy; illegal unreported and unregulated 
(IUU) fishing; the smuggling of arms, people and goods; illegal immigration; 
spills of dangerous substances; the depredation of marine resources; among 
other manifestations of organized crime4. 
Indeed, maritime security in Africa also has direct implications for 
the rest of the world, as in 2007, around 60% of cocaine on the European 
market (valued at USD 1.8 billion) had transited through West Africa. A 
large part of the cargoes of drug trafficking arrives in Africa on cargo ships, 
after which they are transferred in small boats for their expedition to other 
continents. In this regard, of the 775 million USD in contraband cigarettes 
and the approximately 438 million USD in counterfeit medicine for malaria, 
which pass through West Africa, are transported by Sea. Associated with all 
this, it is also estimated that IUU fishing, preferably carried by European and 
Asian commercial vessels, costs Sub-Saharan Africa more than USD 1 billion 
annually (Vogel 2009).
Therefore, the approach presented here aims to deepen the debate on 
maritime issues among the main stakeholders in themes that deal both with 
African matters in general and these maritime crossroads. Therefore, these 
questions will act as another element of analysis on the condition of almost 
abandonment of the borders and maritime spaces of African countries, given 
the evident lethargic stance of the African authorities, with regard to issues 
related to the oceans. Addressing African maritime insecurity is not only 
a socio-political reflection on the facts, but also an economic and Human 
Development vision. In this scientific essay we make a transversal approach 
to issues of maritime insecurity in the continent, with a greater focus on the 
Western region (Gulf of Guinea), listing the main challenges and pointing 
3 Namely: of economic, social and political nature; extremisms and fundamentalisms; 
inappropriate reforms in state structures; the continuous violation of human and collective 
rights; the proliferation of organized crime; among other phenomena that generate new 
systemic and erosive threats, which mark the “New World Order”.
4 These tend to spread, both due to the permeability of the borders of these states, with special 
reference to the states of the sub-Saharan region, as well as the lack of capacity to exercise state 
authority in their maritime spaces (Ginga 2014).
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out some measures to be adopted, with a view to improving the paradigm. 
It is therefore important to understand, what is the role of African states, as 
guarantors of maritime security and defense, and promoters of sustainable 
development on the continent. Also, we can argue: which are the other 
transversal approaches apart from the continent that can help to create a 
maritime cooperation regime for the whole of Africa?
The Maritime Insecurity Dilemma
The African continent geopolitical’s situation is deeply characterized 
by the “geographic wall”, that is represented by the fact that 1/3 of its territory 
has no access to the oceans, hindered by the remaining 2/3. This leads to the 
image of one continent within the other. As stated by Políbio Almeida (1994, 
119), Africa is a world that due to its geopolitical particularities is closely 
linked to the maritime world, in which its potential in mineral resources, 
the oceanic component of all sub-Saharan Africa, among other relevant 
factors in global geopolitics and the geostrategic framework, give their States 
a place of prestige. From the beginning, when it comes to issues related to 
the development of the African continent or the security of the borders of 
its countries, one should not ignore the maritime aspect, since most African 
states are coastal nations.
The African continent is currently going through the third phase of the 
so-called “Scramble for Africa”, motivated by geopolitical, geoeconomic and 
geostrategic reasons, making the largest international powers increasingly 
aware of the dynamics in this continent; in the sense that mineral and energy 
resources occupy a central place in this new position (Abegunrin 2009). 
These continental features associated with structural and socio-political 
weaknesses, intensify the rise of external players interests in African regions, 
making them “desirable” for the main international powers, namely for those 
interested in the exploitation of their natural resources, and for the main 
agents of organized crime.
In the context of the weaknesses, we highlight the feeble capacity to 
maintain maritime borders and the few resources available for the permanent 
exercise of State authority at sea, including the great lakes, rivers and inland 
waterways. Therefore, maritime space and maritime borders are included in 
this increasingly permeable and diffuse system, since the extensive coastline 
of States in the sub-Saharan region of about 30,725 km, further weakens their 
condition (Otto 2020).
This is the face of a continent that has been weakened by maritime 
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insecurity, with consequences for the level of economic development, where 
countries with faint structures weaken the continental condition much 
more. These weaknesses, associated with the low levels of integration and 
cooperation at regional level, have resulted in obstacles with regard to the 
control of maritime borders, both in the territorial sea and the Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ), as well as in international waters where the maritime 
routes that pass through there, which has delayed the development of their 
States. In this understanding, the President of Cameroon, Paul Biya, during 
the Summit of Heads of State and Government on Maritime Security in 
Yaoundé (24-25 June, 2013), argued that maritime insecurity “poses a serious 
threat to the peace and stability of African States (as) it undermines the 
people’s development and well-being”(AU 2013, 2).
In fact, in recent years, the continent that had avoided terrorism and 
religious extremism for many decades has become the new focus of maritime 
radicalization, as “[…] the competitive advantage generated by the region’s 
weak state capacity and rule of law, the existence of well-developed smuggling 
networks, and its geographic location all heighten its appeal to drug trafficking 
cartels and criminal gangs ” (Marc, Verjee and Mogaka 2015, 33). In this 
context, the waters of the continent, namely the regions of the Gulf of Guinea 
(GoG) and the Gulf of Adem (GoA), have been the target of a multiplicity of 
illegal activities, which undermine maritime security and retract economic 
development.
As a result, in recent years, the fight against maritime insecurity 
has occupied a central place in the main development agendas of African 
states, although this awareness is little materialized by the political dynamics 
developed there. Undoubtedly, questions about maritime insecurity in the 
African continent, which are transversal to all its regions, are multidimensional 
in nature, so for reasons of space rationality it would not be possible to analyze 
them within the scope of this article, in the sense that the approach focuses in 
more detail on the context of maritime insecurity on the western coast of the 
Sub-Saharan Africa (GoG region).
Indeed, and recalling the negative side of globalization, the transatlantic 
connections that pass through the Western coast of the continent, associated 
with facilities in terms of natural resources, make the GoG region a highway 
for crime at sea, commonly known as “Highway 10”, attracting all kinds 
of interests and including illicit and illegal activities such as piracy, drug 
trafficking, arms and diamond smuggling, IUU fishing, illegal immigration, 
terrorism, the deposition of substances harmful to the marine environment, 
among other activities originated by greed of many countries, organizations 
and groups (Mugridge 2010). 
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With twelve coastal states, the oceans have immeasurable economic 
value for the GoG region, representing, from the outset, one of the greatest 
assets for their economies. However, in most cases, this economic potential 
remains to be exploited, mainly due to the numerous internal vulnerabilities, 
such as weak state authority, the scarce existing resources and, consequently, 
the deficient patrolling of maritime spaces (Abegunrin 2009). This region, 
marked by war, socio-political instability and extreme poverty, faced with 
the porosity of its borders and the extensive coastline, poorly monitored, 
has faced several illegal activities, in which it stands out: piracy; maritime 
terrorism; IUU fishing; drug trafficking; the smuggling of people, armaments, 
medicines and diamonds; theft of oil and cargo; spills of substances; among 
other manifestations of crime at sea.
“Maritime piracy” has represented one of the main “virus” for the 
African Maritime Domain (AMD) and a big deal for the world of organized 
crime, focusing on regions of considerable geostrategic importance. Whereas 
in the past piracy was fundamentally used as a tool for nations to expand 
their dominance at sea, today, modern piracy has an opposite effect on the 
power of States, contributing to the weakening of their structures and of the 
control of their spaces (Coudenhove- Kalergi 1959). The 20th century was 
marked by the low incidence of piracy attacks in the region, however, in recent 
years, there has been a resurgence of the phenomenon. So far, until the end 
of the 1st decade of the 21st century, East Africa represented the epicenter 
the phenomenon at the global level; according to the annual report of the 
“American One Earth Future Foundation”, by the end of June 2012, piracy 
had yielded around USD 160 million in favor of pirates, having cost the world 
economy around 700 million USD.
The business has been fundamentally fueled by cargo theft and the 
rescue of people and goods, with a direct economic impact on regional stability 
and development (Onuoha 2012, 2, Miah 2012). Currently and according to 
the annual reports of the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), 2016, 2017, 
2018 and 2019, in recent years this phenomenon has taken on a worrying 
dimension, especially on the western coast of the continent, being already 
considered the “New Pirate Hot Spot”, as pirates have developed their mode 
of action and the respective instruments, which has allowed them to reach 
greater distances (IMB 2020).
However, the data presented by the 2017 Oceans Beyond Piracy/
American One Earth Future Foundation report, describes that “the number 
of seafarers affected by piracy and armed robbery in 2017 decreased slightly 
from 2016 […] in total, 1,726 seafarers were affected by piracy and armed 
robbery in 2017 in West African waters, compared to 1,921 in 2016” (AOEFF 
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2018, 12), although for the first time in two consecutive years, incidents of 
abduction at sea have been observed in the region5.  Thus, as a general rule, 
while piracy in the Horn of Africa has been decreasing since 2012, there 
has been a considerable increase in piracy, with armed robbery, and other 
maritime crimes in the GoG region, where there is one of the largest oil 
fields. offshore, making it urgent for African states to intervene to combat 
this phenomenon (UNODC 2016). 
In the GoG region, pirates are part of the group of stakeholders in 
oil and natural gas exploration, taking advantage of the increased maritime 
activity in this region, in the sense that in the period between January 2014 to 
December 2018, more than 200 attempts attacks on ships were perpetrated 
by pirates on the west coast of the African continent (IMB 2020). As a result, 
it is clear that in these regions, the cause of piracy is always associated with 
the void of authority of States in maritime spaces, specifically due to political 
instability, civil war, ineffective public policies and lack of resources on land.
 As a result, in recent years, oil carriers have been the preferred 
target, which according to Assis Malaquias (2012), “Their main targets are 
oil tankers. They’re after the oil. They rob the tankers then transfer the oil to 
smaller ships, which transfer it again to other ships, until it gets track of it. 
They’re not really after cargo, ships, or anything other than oil”. This activity 
commonly known as “illegal oil bunkering” has also been the driving force 
behind the phenomenon of piracy in the GoG region, especially as the oil 
assault has been very profitable for criminal groups, who use the black market 
to dispose of this cargo, favored by a powerful transnational mafia, which 
finances and facilitates pirate operations; which often makes piracy confused 
with the phenomenon of terrorism (Baldauf 2012).
Likewise, “maritime terrorism”6, which is not easily dissociated 
from piracy due to its complex nature and at the same time transversal to all 
other manifestations of organized crime at sea, has worried African states. 
5 Although an exception, on the contrary, on the east bank there was a slight increase in 
incidents with pirates, including the hijackings of the ships Aris 13, Asayr 2 and Al Kausar. For 
more see. <http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/reports/sop/east-africa>. Accessed on: February 15, 
2020.
6 The concept of maritime terrorism differs from the notion of maritime piracy, due to its 
nature, and the differential factor is found in the motivations and objectives that characterize 
both phenomena: piracy is generally motivated by private private, without underlying political-
ideological objectives, while maritime terrorism is perceived as one of the several forms of 
armed rebellion, generally of an ideological political character, aimed at provocation-repression-
destabilization. Maritime piracy thus appears as an instrument of maritime terrorism, and 
terrorism covers all illegal activities in the maritime space, which are politically and ideologically 
motivated (Cottim 2008).
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Especially, due to the greater dimension and expression that some movements 
have acquired in recent years, such as the Movement for the Emancipation of 
the Niger Delta (MEND) and Boko Haram, undermining stability in these 
countries and contaminating the regional socio-political environment; as there 
have been several acts of maritime terrorism, particularly in the oil industry, 
resulting in damage to oil infrastructure and economic and environmental 
damage.
In fact, maritime terrorism is a real threat that has jeopardized 
the security and stability of the international system7, and the motivations 
of terrorist organizations have been varied, with the main targets being 
precious cargo or maritime infrastructure, with use or not of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction (WMD) (Ridley 2014). In the western region of the African 
continent, cargo theft and spillage of crude oil at sea have been the main 
manifestations of this aspect of crime at sea, expressing the negative potential 
that terrorism has in relation to the economy and the marine environment, 
being harmful to the environment, economy and territorial sovereignty, as 
this phenomenon is particularly condemned by the “SUA Convention 1988” 
and its “Protocol of 2005”.
Thus, the cases of the Bonga oil platform, attacked 60 nautical miles 
from the Niger Delta in June 2008 by MEDN, forcing the stop in production 
operations; the disappearance of the Liberian-flagged oil tanker Kerala, at the 
service of the National Fuel Society of Angola, in January 2014, with losses of 
several tons of diesel; or the Norwegian flag carrier MV Bonita, approached 
by pirates in November 2019; reflect the insurgency of terrorist movements 
in this region (Ginga 2014, IMB 2019).
In addition, and in the last decade, there has been an increase in “drug 
trafficking” in the sub-Saharan region, which has contributed even more to its 
maritime insecurity. In this context, the geographical situation of West Africa, 
between Latin America and Europe, associated with the permeability of its 
maritime borders, makes these States attractive for this activity, in the sense 
that the last decade “[…] has seen West Africa catapulted to global notoriety 
for its role as a key transit point in the trafficking of narcotics between Latin 
America and Europe […]” (Marc, Verjee & Mogaka 2015, 33).
Since 2006, West African countries have been part of the main routes 
used to transport cocaine from South America to Europe, as large quantities of 
7 The first major global event of maritime terrorism in recent international history took place 
in October 1985, when the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro was hijacked, in the Mediterranean, 
by a group of Palestinian terrorists, who created terror and murdered Leon Klinghoffer, an 
American passenger. This event led to the creation of the “Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation” - SUA 1988.
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cocaine have been confiscated, representing only a portion of a large volume 
of business, generally transported by small ships and private jets, intended 
for traffickers from West African countries, as the epicenter of cocaine on 
the continent (UNODC 2018). In this context, the Western coast, namely 
the GoG region, appears as a preferential zone for the passage of criminal 
organizations sea routes, in a context in which most of the cocaine (60%) 
transported by sea, destined for Europe, passes by GoG. The region today 
represents a hub for the command and control of illicit cargo, originating 
in most countries in Latin America, making this activity support the other 
variants of organized crime in the region (Mugridge 2010).
Consequently, there has been an increase in the overflow of drug 
trafficking in the waters of the states of this region, with these loads later 
being transferred to neighboring countries, from which most of them are 
sent to Europe and North Africa (UNODC 2018). As former United Nations 
Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon argued, “drug trafficking does not respect 
borders […] the transnational nature of the threat means that no country 
can face it alone” (UNODC 2009), so poor cooperation between states at 
the regional level has largely favored organized crime networks, as annual 
cocaine transhipments in West Africa are estimated to vary widely between 
60 and 250 tonnes, with a revenue of between 3-14 billions USD annually.
Thus, just as piracy, terrorism and drug trafficking damage trade and 
make investment in Africa more risky and costly, “IUU fishing” weakens 
economic development, aggravating food security challenges on the continent. 
According to estimates, currently one in four fish in Africa is caught illegally. 
IUU fishing has jeopardized the sustainability of fish stocks, damaging the 
ecosystem, depriving governments of income and African peoples of their 
means of subsistence8, and according to Peter Thomson, United Nations 
Special Envoy for the Ocean, the scourge is affecting most African nations, 
mainly because 38 of the 54 African states have coastal borders and many 
inland countries have vast lakes, which have also been affected by IUU fishing 
and poor fishing practices (Holmyard 2018).
In West Africa, their practices cost the region around USD 1.3 billion 
annually, which has increasingly attracted the attention of African leaders to 
the dimension of crime, forcing them to take more proactive attitudes, in 
order to fight against this crime. The issue of IUU fishing in Africa has been 
well studied and numerous solutions have been proposed, including the 2016 
report by the “Overseas Development Institute” and the Spanish research and 
8 It is estimated that IUU fishing represents 40% of the annual catches in the West African 
region, and is therefore considered to be the region with the highest level of IUU fishing 
(Osinowo 2015, 2).
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journalism group, which used satellite tracking to monitor methods and scale 
of the problem, highlighting that overflows, lack of inspection of cargo in 
containers, inadequate legal qualifications, deficient technology and lack of 
political will, have been the main causes of this phenomenon. The report 
estimated that, by developing and protecting fisheries on the continent, 
around USD 3 billion would be saved and more than 300,000 jobs created 
(Holmyard 2018), in a scenario where according to the data presented by the 
Economic Commission of the Nations United for Africa (United Nations 
Economic Commission for Africa - UNECA), “[…] around USD 42 billion per 
year leaves the continent through illegal fishing and illegal logging, among 
other causes” (UNECA 2016, 3).
China is the largest fishing power in West Africa, with more than 500 
industrial fishing vessels operating in the waters of the region, so it should 
play a greater role in eradicating illegal practices in its fleet, excluding the 
widespread use of illegal mesh nets and a ban on shark hunting, as described 
by Greenpeace reports. Since 2016, China has canceled subsidies amounting 
to USD 111.6 million for 264 vessels that practiced illegal fishing, as well 
as revoking the fishing licenses in foreign waters of several companies, 
publicizing a blacklist of vessels and professionals of the area9.
At the same time, there are still other manifestations of organized 
crime on the continent, such as illegal immigration, smuggling of people and 
minerals, arms trafficking, the deposit of dangerous materials, among other 
activities that weaken maritime security, hampering transport and maritime 
trade, and motivating a growing disturbance in the international political 
system. In the meantime and with regard to “arms trafficking”, it is observed 
that the issue of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the GoG, 
in recent years, has become a major threat to maritime security, which must 
be resolved urgently, under penalty of perpetuating socio-political instability 
in the region.
For its turn, and regarding “illegal immigration and human trafficking”, 
by or through the sea, there has been a growth of this phenomenon in 
continental waters, currently constituting a serious threat to sovereignty, 
specifically because it calls into question human rights. This phenomenon 
cannot be combated in isolation, especially in a local context where the security 
9 China may have the largest fleet operating in Africa, however it is not the only one that 
benefits from IUU fishing. In 2017, the ocean conservation group, OCEANA, revealed that 
some European countries, including Greece, Italy and Portugal, had encouraged IUU fishing 
along the African coast, as in April 2018 it identified and tracked a vessel Spanish commercial 
that turned off its automatic identification system (AIS) while fishing in African waters 
(Holmyard 2018).
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forces at sea are ineffective, making it necessary for African States to evolve 
their naval doctrines towards a broader and more shared maritime vision in 
order to together to identify the challenges faced and outline strategies for 
maritime safety (Baker 2011, 40).
According to some observers in assessment and information missions 
at the GoG region, from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC), currently any state in the region has a combination of sufficiently 
capable criminal law and formal legal instruments to penalize some variants 
of crime at sea, namely piracy and maritime terrorism; what has promoted the 
cyclical backwardness in these States, in matters related to the construction of 
local capacities, within the scope of maritime security10, necessary to counter 
the increasing crime in this region (UNODC 2016, 26). In short, maritime 
insecurity in Africa has thus posed a permanent transnational threat to 
global security, as the “security at sea” factor is essential in consolidating 
onshore development and that both are strategic elements for the continent’s 
sustainable development and for preservation of global stability. As a result, in 
recent years, African states have been committed to promoting and preserving 
good order at sea, in order to improve maritime safety in their waters, thus 
promoting local development.
Maritime Security Challenges and Tools
According to the Brenthurst Foundation (2010, 10), Maritime 
Security from an African perspective must result from the set of actions “[…] 
that creates, sustains or improves the secure use of Africa’s waterways and 
the infrastructure that supports these waterways”, particularly since most 
maritime threats, be they structural or circumstantial, if not properly opposed, 
can become the focus of interstate conflict, jeopardizing human security and 
territorial integrity. Everything has been enlarged, because maritime borders 
are difficult to guard, as maritime threats are not isolated, on the contrary they 
reinforce each other. 
Therefore, whatever the form of manifestation of the threats, due to 
their magnitude, due to the fact that they are intimately interconnected and 
have a variety of impacts, they demand from the African States a combined 
10 The concept of Security currently includes matters related to “security”, associated with 
protection against conscious threats to ships, people, infrastructure and equipment related to 
maritime activities, involving instruments of strength and measures to protect navigation and 
sea resources and fight crime in maritime spaces; and matters related to “safety”, corresponding 
to safety at sea in the context of preventing accidents at sea and subsequent actions in the event 
of an accident, to the rules for the safe conduct of navigation (Ginga 2014, 54).
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and continuous response from the forces involved in defense and security 
issues. maritime This applies at the global, continental, regional and even 
local level, where responsibilities on maritime security issues should not 
remain the exclusive concern of government authorities, but dealt with by 
a whole range of state and non-state actors, with intervention directly or 
indirectly in these issues.
Thus, after a slow rise in the continental security agenda in recent 
years, maritime security has occupied a central position in the regional 
context, as there is now a growing awareness of maritime security issues. For 
all these reasons and considering that AMD has a high potential for creating 
wealth and preserving regional stability, African States have been paying 
greater attention to matters relating to the maritime environment, namely in 
terms of maritime defense and security, to address the insecurity indices in 
their waters.
A new notion of maritime frontier emerges in the continent, 
regarding security and defense issues. Also, the role of African States in the 
main decision forum of political consultation on maritime affairs has grown, 
especially because, today, maritime security is being regarded as a central 
pillar in economic development policies (Adejumobi & Olukoshi 2008). In 
a more articulated way, in 2009, the debate11 on maritime security reaches 
the AU agenda, influenced by a series of Resolutions adopted by the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC), and during the 15th Ordinary Session of 
the AU Assembly in July 2009, African leaders expressed concern about the 
growing insecurity in African maritime spaces in general, and Somalia in 
particular (AU 2009a).
As a follow-up, the AU Department of Infrastructure and Energy 
organized the 2nd Conference of Transport Ministers of the African Union, 
between 12-16 October of the same year, having adopted the “Durban 
Resolution on Maritime Safety, Maritime Security and Protection of the marine 
environment in Africa ”, which reaffirms the Member States’ commitment to 
UNCLOS; with the initiatives conducted by the IMO and the UNSC; with 
its responsibilities in the field of maritime safety; with the intensification 
of coordination dynamics in search of joint responses to face the scourge of 
11 This debate around maritime security in Africa was sponsored by the United Nations and 
the International Maritime Organization (IMO), and on January 14, 2009 the “Contact Group 
on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia” was established, in compliance with Resolution 1851 (2008) 
of the UNSC. The IMO organized the meeting between 16 Arab and African states in Djibouti 
on January 26, 2009, which adopted a Code of Conduct on the crackdown on piracy and armed 
robbery against ships in the Western Indian Ocean and GA - “Code of conduct of Djibouti - 
DCC”(IMO 2009).
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maritime piracy and insecurity; with the creation of a regional network to 
support the fight against maritime crime, among others (AU 2009b).
Aware that maritime piracy, armed robbery and other illegal activities 
constitute a serious threat to the maritime domain of Central and West 
Africa, the UNSC, through the “Resolutions” 2018 (2011) and 2039 (2012), 
urged the States of the regional economic communities (ECCAS - Economic 
Community of Central African States; and ECOWAS - Economic Community 
of West African States) and the GoG region to take immediate action at local 
and regional level, leading to the implementation of a legal and doctrine 
framework to tackle maritime insecurity. 
As a result, between 24-25 June 2013, in Yaoundé, there was the 
“Summit of Heads of State and Government on maritime protection and 
security in the Gulf of Guinea”, where three diplomas in the field of maritime 
security were approved, namely: the “Code of conduct on the suppression 
of piracy, armed robbery against ships, and illegal maritime activity in West 
and Central Africa” (Yaoundé Code of Conduct - YCC); the “Declaration by 
the Heads of State and Government of the States of Central and West Africa” 
for maritime safety and security in their common maritime domain; and the 
“Memorandum of Understanding” (MoU) between ECCAS, ECOWAS and 
GGC, on maritime security in Central and West Africa - linked to maritime 
protection and security in Central and West Africa, and the GoG region12.
In this context, the 2013 Declaration of Heads of State and Government 
of the States of Central and West Africa on Maritime Security in their 
Common Maritime Domain, represents the main instrument of this meeting 
and a pioneering document on cooperation and information sharing at the 
level of maritime safety, as it expresses the recognition that States have been 
giving to issues related to safety at sea. At the national level, the focus will be 
on inter-ministerial coordination, mechanisms for cooperation between state 
institutions and private sector partners, and the preparation of responses to 
counter insecurity at sea. At the regional level, this meeting determined the 
creation of the well-known YCC.
Later, on June 5, 2014, the three bodies signed the Additional Protocol 
to the MoU between CEEAC, ECOWAS and GGC, which establishes the 
creation of the Interregional Coordination Center (ICC), having been opened in 
September of the same year in Yaoundé (ICC, 2014). The ICC is an instrument 
12 With regard to building an architecture for regional maritime safety, ECCAS was the first 
to adopt an instrument leading to this vision, through the Protocol that created the Integrated 
Strategy for Maritime Safety (ISMS), in 2009; followed by GGC which adopted an Integrated 
Maritime Strategy for the region on 10 August 2013, and finally by ECOWAS which approved 
the Integrated Maritime Strategy for the region in March 2014 (ICC 2017).
Maritime Insecurity in Sub-Saharan Africa and its effects in the Economy of States
208 Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations
v.9, n.18, Jul./Dec. 2020
at the strategic level of cooperation, coordination and communication between 
the member states of the three organizations, including information sharing, 
the development of good practices and training in preventing and combating 
piracy, armed robbery and others illicit activities at sea. The 24 YCC signatory 
states are grouped into 5 maritime zones, each supported by regional 
coordination centers, that is, one for ECOWAS (Maritime Security Regional 
Coordination Centre for Western Africa - CRESMAO) and another for ECCAS 
(Regional Center For Maritime Security in Central Africa - CRESMAC), 
being coordinated by an Interregional Coordination Center (ICC), which is 
supervised by the three regional organizations (ICC 2017).
The YCC and the ICC, in the framework of the IMO Strategy to 
strengthen maritime protection in Africa, appear as a continuation of the DCC 
and a complement to the 2017 “Jeddah Amendment”13, which introduces to 
the code other modalities of maritime crime in the Indian Ocean and Gulf of 
Adem to fight, according to Admiral Adejimi Osinowo “the main value of this 
initiative lies in the sharing of information and in the establishment of the 
necessary authorization protocols to pursue suspect ships across maritime 
borders” (2015, 4) . In fact, no region on the continent has seen a faster and 
more extensive growth in maritime security architecture over the past few 
years than the GoG region, with a set of instruments and institutions, making 
the Yaoundé Architecture for Security and Maritime Protection (YASMP) 
constitutes a success story, at continental level.
At the same time, with respect to Resolution A.1069 (28) (2014), the 
IMO developed and implemented a “tabletop exercises” program for the 
GoG, aimed at promoting an inter-state approach to maritime protection 
and application of the law of the sea in West and Central Africa. This 
program aims to demonstrate the need for cooperation between government 
departments and local agencies, through probable and simulated scenarios, 
in order to determine the best methods, processes and procedures, for the 
operationalization of a joint maritime strategy in the region (Araujo 2015).
This framework appears in convergence with the need for African 
13 In contrast to the DCC, which focuses primarily on piracy, the YCC contains a comprehensive 
approach to regional maritime security, aimed at combating not only piracy and armed robbery 
against ships, but all other manifestations of crime at sea, making it much broader in scope. 
The “DCC Amendment” constitutes a non-binding agreement between 21 East African 
countries, emerging as a revised Code of Conduct, regarding the crackdown on piracy, armed 
assault on ships and other manifestations of maritime crime in the western Indian Ocean and 
in GA region. The agreement is based on 4 main pillars (regional training; review of the local 
and regional legal framework; information sharing and local capacity building), with the aim of 
strengthening regional cooperation and coordination and developing the training and capacity 
necessary for local authorities assume their role in combating crime at sea (Araújo 2015).
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States to implement a true African maritime security architecture, as 
advocated by the “Integrated African Strategy for Seas and Oceans 2050”14 
(AIM 2050 Strategy). AIM 2050 was developed as a tool to address Africa’s 
maritime challenges, in order to create wealth from Africa’s oceans, seas and 
inland waterways, by developing a thriving maritime economy and exploiting 
the full potential of maritime activities in an environmentally sustainable way 
(AU 2012).
Furthermore, the “African Union Charter on Maritime Protection 
and Security and Development in Africa” (Lomé Charter), adopted at the 
African Union Extraordinary Summit on October 15, 2016 in Lomé, also 
emerges as an important instrument, in the range of local initiatives aimed at 
countering the dilemma of maritime insecurity on the continent. The Lomé 
Charter aims to make maritime space the main catalyst for Africa’s socio-
economic development, reinforcing the need to implement the MoU15, signed 
in July 2008, between IMO and MOWCA (Maritime Organization for West 
and Central African), within the framework the IMO’s Integrated Technical 
Cooperation Programme (ITCP); to establish an integrated subregional coast 
guard network in West and Central Africa, and the respective framework for 
cooperation and guidance for the implementation of this integrated network 
(MOWCA 2008, Chatham House 2012, 16). 
With regard to IUU fishing and according to the organization “Stop 
Illegal Fishing”, an independent, non-profit organization based in Africa, 
dedicated to eradicate illegal fishing in the waters of the continent, African 
states have made efforts to curb with the phenomenon of IUU fishing, 
however, the phenomenon needs a new approach on their part. In the 
meantime, “Africa’s Blue Economy: a policy handbook” presents a set of 
lines of action to mitigate IUU fishing, in addition to fighting against marine 
pollution and piracy, envisioning a fast and diversified economic growth in 
the continent16 (UNECA 2016).
14 Born at the 13th Ordinary Session of the AU Conference, held in Sirte, in July 2009, formalized 
in 2012, and adopted on January 31, 2014 in Addis Ababa. The IMO actively participated in 
collaboration with the AU in the development of the AIM 2050 Strategy, which is based on 
the continent, through three regional offices, located in Abidjan (Côte d’Ivoire), Accra (Ghana) 
and Nairobi (Kenya), based in MoU signed between the IMO and the host States. For more 
see. <http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/TechnicalCooperation/GeographicalCoverage/Africa/
Pages/Default.aspx>. Accessed on January 14, 2020.
15 Signed by 16 of its 20 coastal Member States, the MoU aimed to undertake cyclical efforts in 
the maritime domain, with a view to protecting human life, enforcing the law at sea, countering 
criminal activities at sea, improving maritime safety and protecting sea resources.
16 In recent years, UNECA has started to provide more local, national and regional support 
to support the development of the African “Blue Economy”, working with other international 
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At the same time, the “Gulf of Guinea Maritime Trade Information 
Sharing Center”17 (MTISC GoG), established by the International Maritime 
Forum of Petroleum Companies as a pilot project, went into operation in 
October 2014, having been hosted at the Accra Regional Maritime University 
in Ghana. The main goal of MTISC GoG was to establish a regional center 
for sharing maritime information in the region. On June 15, 2016, MTISC-
GoG closed after the pilot project was successful. In response, the French 
and British authorities, drawing on the experience gained with MTISC-GoG, 
launched a new contribution to the maritime information sharing network at 
GoG, through a virtual information center.
The new France-United Kingdom center, called Marine Domain 
Awareness for Trade - Golf of Guinea  (MDAT-GoG), started operations in 
June 2016, strengthening the capacity of the states in the region at the level of 
“Maritime Domain Awareness”18 (MDA), serving as platform par excellence 
for sharing data, information and knowledge among the states of the region, 
as it is intended to provide a detailed overview of the maritime domain of 
waters in the West African region19. This initiative was associated with the 
program created by the European Union, “the European Union supports the 
Critical Maritime Routes Program”, and implemented in 40 States, including 
partners, including the AU, the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and the African 
Development Bank (AfDB), which have the Blue Economy at the forefront of their economic 
priorities for the continent.
17 In addition to providing operational advice and situational awareness to merchant ships in 
the region, reducing the risk of being attacked by organized crime groups, the MTISC-GoG 
multinational surveillance team also provided support to ship captains and shipowners who 
had been victims of acts criminals. MDAT-GoG is currently operated remotely by the French 
and UK navies, from centers located in Brest (France) and Portsmouth (United Kingdom). For 
more see. <http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/WestAfrica/Pages/Code-of-Conduct-a-
gainst-illicit-maritime-activity.aspx>. Accessed on February 13, 2020.
18 The concept of “Maritime Domain Awareness” originates from the North American doctrine 
of the “US Homeland Security Department”, which in a better translation means “Situational 
Awareness of Maritime Domain”, which translates as a continuous and regular knowledge 
about the maritime environment of the region in question. Its main objective is to gather 
as much information about any ship or vessel in a given region; and analyze them with the 
support of a set of means and resources of “intelligence” (maritime intelligence), in order to 
allow “the effective understanding of any issue associated with the maritime domain that may 
impact security, protection, economy or environment” (US HSD 2005, ii).
19 MDAT-GoG manages a traffic scheme with a Voluntary Reporting Area (VRA), with routes 
and points of voluntary reporting, so merchant ships are encouraged to follow this scheme 
while traveling in this region. In November 2019, the Portuguese Navy vessel “NRP Zaire” 
fulfilled a mission to accompany the merchant ship “Maersk Tema”, which transited off the 
waters of the Republic of São Tomé and Principe, following a piracy attack alert, done through 
MDAT-GoG. For more see. <https://www.noticiasdecoimbra.pt/marinha-portuguesa-procura-
-piratas-no-golfo-da-guine/>. Accessed on February 19, 2020.
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in the countries of the GoG region through CRIMGO (Critical Maritime 
Routes Gulf of Guinea), during the 2013-2016 period20.
Locally, recognizing that the history of maritime safety and the 
protection of the marine environment in the West African sub-region is full 
of incidents that expose the lack of capacity and local response, maritime 
terrorism and piracy appear as the main evaluation criteria the context of 
insecurity, in the sense that States continue to improve their capacities for 
inspection and surveillance, either through the acquisition of new naval 
means, or through the implementation of more exercises combined between 
the different forces in the field of maritime security and defense. 
Understanding the maritime weaknesses of African states allows 
combating crime in maritime spaces, especially since the quantification of 
economic, human and environmental costs is essential to understand the 
true impact of crime at sea. Thus, according to the report presented by the 
platform “Oceans Beyond Piracy”, in 2017, the total economic cost to counter 
acts of terrorism and piracy, in the West African region, amounted to 818 
million USD21. In view of this, in recent years, there has been an increase 
of around 27% in the response rate to attack incidents by maritime security 
forces (Steffen 2016). 
In short, in recent years, even if in a less orderly manner, African States 
have deepened ties of sharing and cooperation, with a view to improving 
maritime security in their waters and ensuring sustainability in the exploitation 
of marine resources in these spaces; to the extent that it is inferred that the 
creation of capacity in terms of maritime protection and safety, in order to 
face the challenges, must be a continuous and comprehensive priority.
Therefore, there are several manifestations of this greater interest by the 
states in the region for issues involving maritime security, and it is important 
to highlight: the “operational MoU” between the coast guards of Nigeria 
and Benin, which aims to patrol the waters to combat the organized crime 
in the region’s waters; o Maritime interdiction military exercise “Obangame 
Express”, with the participation of several naval forces; cooperation between 
the navies of South Africa, Namibia and Mozambique; the “Benguela Current 
Convention”, a tripartite agreement between the Republics of Angola, 
Namibia and South Africa, to promote a coordinated regional approach for 
the protection of the large Benguela Current marine ecosystem; among other 
20 For more see. <https://criticalmaritimeroutes.eu/projects/crimgo/>. Accessed on March 
16, 2020.
21 For more see. <http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/reports/sop/west-africa>. Accessed on 
March 23, 2020.
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local, regional and international initiatives.
A Prospective Vision for the African Continent
The changing global geopolitical framework is forcing African states 
to pay greater attention to issues related to maritime insecurity, for the defense 
of national interests and the promotion of economic development. In fact, 
there is an awareness that peace and political stability in Africa will essentially 
result from the increase in human security, which is not guaranteed only by 
the “sum of the security of each State”, but by the set of synergies driven 
between States and African Regional Organizations (ARO), since the latter 
constitutes a privileged linkage between International Organizations and 
non-African cooperating States, broadening the bimultilateral perspective of 
cooperation for security and defense issues in the region. 
Therefore, today, cross-border cooperation relations are the highest 
exponent of political action within regions, so ARO should continue to serve as 
a platform for the implementation of the dynamics of multilateral cooperation 
and existing bimultilateral cooperation agreements. In this domain, just as on 
land, in the oceans, AROs must form the basis for maintaining the “New 
African Order”, and must share with the States the responsibility for the 
continent’s destinations, namely in terms of maritime security; regardless of 
the maritime security architecture on the continent (Vines 2013, 93).
Within this framework, it is understood that at the “domestic” level 
there should be a greater sharing of responsibilities between the various actors 
who, directly or indirectly, operate in maritime affairs, especially because the 
oceans are, by nature and dimension, spaces for multidimensional cooperation, 
sharing and collective use. Thus, the implementation of management and the 
use of instruments suitable for the multiplicity of activities related to maritime 
spaces is required, not only due to the diversity of actors operating there, 
but because the reinforcement of safety at sea depends more on a strategic 
management22 of this space, than the constant commitment of naval forces 
(Osinowo 2015).
At the regional level, this strategic management should be conducted 
from two perspectives. The first is linked to the “system software”, that is, the 
22 African states, in general, should define and identify safe shipping corridors, with anchora-
ges, mooring buoy zones for ships, among other essential points, to protect maritime trade cir-
culating within their territorial waters and EEZ, as a reproduction and extension of the model 
implemented by the French and UK navies, the MDAT-GoG, which defined an “Internationally 
Recommended Traffic Corridor” in the West African region.
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implementation and viability of a set of instruments of the legal and doctrinal 
framework, which highlights the harmonization of local legislation in the 
various States of the region, the adaptation to international conventions and 
protocols, bimultilateral agreements and protocols in the scope of maritime 
protection, inspection, security and defense, among other instruments. The 
second related to the “system hardware”, corresponding to the physical and 
infrastructural resources, necessary for the consolidation of any model of 
integrated governance of maritime spaces, which includes the necessary 
means for the permanent control and monitoring of the region’s maritime 
space, that is, the naval means, marking systems, radar systems on land 
(Vessell Traffic Service - VTS), centers for coordinating information and 
maritime operations, among other resources that strengthen regional capacity 
at the level of the Maritime Domain Awereness.
Furthermore, in order to guarantee maritime safety and the desired 
interoperability of Forces at sea, it is essential that African States continue 
to operate in a network, in order to guarantee complementarity between the 
means available in the region, with trained crews and a support system in land, 
which guarantee the permanent exercise of State authority at sea (Mcnicholas 
2011). It is, therefore, about promoting regional and continental initiatives to 
strengthen local maritime capacities, as well as harmonizing local regulations 
and legislation23, with a perspective of sharing experiences and information, 
within the framework of maritime protection, defense and security. 
Much remains to be done, so the political will and the desire to 
cooperate on the part of African States will emerge as decisive factors, 
essentially because the actions taken by States alone are insufficient, in the 
medium and long term, to fight networks organized crime, in a context in 
which crime at sea results from concerted action between local criminal 
communities, associated with local entities, and financed by transnational 
organized crime networks.
Final Remarks
In order to highligth the main lines of thought presented throughout 
this scientific article on the African maritime environment, we had stressed 
that maritime insecurity on the continent has strong economic impacts for 
its States, as its economic structure is strongly dependent on exploitation of 
23 A central issue has been the lack of judgment and condemnation of pirates and others 
involved in maritime crime, as a consequence of the lack of internal legislation necessary to 
criminalize illegal activities at sea (Osinowo 2015).
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maritime resources and maritime trade. Maritime insecurity allowed illicit 
activities to flourish within the borders of African states, which added to the 
problems of internal instability, have resulted in the emergence of failed states 
on the continent. 
In reality, AMD had been a source of regional insecurity, affecting 
continental stability. Piracy, maritime terrorism, drug trafficking, IUU 
fishing, illegal immigration, arms smuggling and other threats that develop 
in African waters, have hampered the exercise of state authority and have 
a negative impact on the continental economy, Coastal states will not have 
sustainable economic development without guaranteeing minimum levels of 
maritime security.
Addressing maritime insecurity in Africa means reporting mainly on 
the current context, where African states attach greater importance to issues 
inherent to maritime security, as, in recent years, there has been a greater 
concern on the part of these states with issues linked to maritime security on 
the continent. Although there is some progress regarding the way to address 
the issue of maritime insecurity, the scarcity in terms of resources has affected 
the implementation of the main Maritime security Strategies, drawn up at the 
local, regional and continental level. In fact, both maritime security efforts 
and the development of maritime affairs corporate governance have been 
hindered by the lack of capacity of African states.
Therefore, it is considered that States and ONP need to improve 
their integrated and coordinated approach to maritime affairs, as they must 
adjust their security agendas to mitigate the main threats to continental 
maritime security, because, on a large scale, it will allow a better exploitation 
of the economic benefits and opportunities of the oceans. Especially, because 
the continental future, both in terms of opportunities and challenges, is 
associated with the seas and oceans, as the vast African maritime domain 
contains numerous resources that, if sustainably explored, will provide 
African generations with significant resources to strengthen their continued 
growth and development efforts.
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ABSTRACT
It seems clear that African leaders are not aware of the maritime dimension of their 
states, which has led to a subordination of maritime affairs compared to land issues, 
as it is essential that African states begin to take concrete steps in order to establish, 
on the continent, a true maritime security and defense architecture, with the aim 
of making the best use of the opportunities offered by the oceans, in the name 
of the interests of these States. The approach was possible, using a bibliographic 
and documentary review, through a qualitative methodology, following a deductive 
reasoning.
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